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Representation in Measurement 
 
Abstract 
The Representational Theory of Measurement (RTM) is the best known account of the kind 
of representation measurement requires. However, RTM has been challenged from various 
angles, with critics claiming e.g. that RTM fails to account for actual measurement practice 
and that it is ambiguous about the nature of measurable attributes. In this paper I use the 
critical literature on RTM to formulate Representation Minimalism – a characterization of 
what measurement-relevant representation requires at the minimum. I argue that 
Representation Minimalism avoids the main problems with RTM while acknowledging its 
usefulness as the formal foundation of representation in measurement. 
 
1. Introduction 
Measurement is representation – that much is usually agreed upon. The best known and 
most ambitious account of the kind of representation measurement requires is called the 
Representational Theory of Measurement (RTM). RTM received its authorative expression 
in three volumes entitled Foundations of Measurement, which were written by philosopher 
Patrick Suppes and psychologists R. Duncan Luce, Amos Tversky and David Krantz. The 
books appeared in 1971, 1989 and 1991. Since then, RTM has played a role in decision-
theory in economics and philosophy, as well as in economic theory more generally.  
Nonetheless, the content and usefulness of RTM are debated. Some argue 
that RTM is a formal theory specifying conditions of measurement, others argue that RTM 
is an epistemological theory specifying how to go about measuring (Tal 2012 introduces 
alternative interpretations). Some argue that RTM is useful for measurement (Baccelli, 
2020; Heilmann, 2015), others argue that it may be redundant in some contexts (Angner, 
2011). Some argue that RTM may have formal merits but that it is useless for the practical 
execution of measurement (Mari, Carbone, Giordani, & Petri, 2017; Reiss, 2008), still 
 2 
others say that RTM fails as an approach to measurement and should be replaced by 
something else (Michell, 2005, 2020). Clearly, RTM is not the kind shared background one 
can lean on when debating and improving measurement practices. 
The benefit of a rich, critical literature on RTM is that it signposts 
controversial aspects of representation. The literature on RTM therefore provides a 
roadmap of pitfalls to avoid when developing a new account of measurement-relevant 
representation. In this paper, I set out to define minimal conditions for representation in a 
measurement context. Accordingly, my account is called Representation Minimalism.  
Why would one want minimal conditions of measurement-relevant 
representation, rather than a bold, full-fledged account? I think that neutral, common 
ground is sorely needed in the measurement literature. There are various on-going debates 
that are so multifaceted that it is hard to disentangle the exact source of the controversy. 
This increases the risk of people talking past each other. As an example, consider the 
literature on RTM. Some people argue that RTM is useful for measurement (Cartwright, 
Bradburn, & Fuller, 2016; Heilmann, 2015), others argue that it is untenable or useless 
(Michell, 1997, 2020). This looks like a genuine controversy (as opposed to a terminological 
one), and some authors treat it as such. But if different authors characterize RTM in 
different ways, the arguments of proponents of seemingly opposing views might in fact be 
compatible with each other. What looks like a substantial controversy, might not be one.  
A similar situation is present in the literature on operationalism – 
operationalism stands for some version of the idea that it is permissible to define target 
attributes, e.g. depression or length, in terms of the measurement procedure intended to 
capture that concept. Many authors argue vehemently against operationalism (Borsboom, 
Mellenbergh, & van Heerden, 2003; Maul & McGrane, 2017), while others find forms of it 
defensible (Chang, 2017; Feest, 2010). Is this a genuine controversy or just people talking 
about different things under the same term? By now operationalism has so many different 
definitions and characterizations, that it is hard to tell whether critics and proponents are 
talking about the same thing. Some common, definitional ground regarding the nature of 
successful measurement would help researchers name the exact sources of their 
disagreement – if in fact there is disagreement. 
There is also considerable controversy about the measurability, and 
numerical representability, of individual concepts or constructs, especially in the human 
 3 
sciences. 1 Intelligence, well-being, health and countless other attributes are measured in 
a myriad of ways without any consensus on what it takes to adequately numerically 
represent them. These controversies have tangible effects: for example, unresolved 
debates about adequate measurement of depression lead to situations where a drug looks 
effective or ineffective depending on which measure is being used (Le Noury et al., 2015; 
Snaith, 1993). Another measurement-related debate is the one that asks whether there is 
some fundamental difference between the ways in which numbers represent attributes in 
the social sciences and in the natural sciences (Michell, 1986). A minimal account of 
measurement-relevant representation will not resolve these debates. But recognizing a 
neutral common ground is a useful starting point. If we can find such a common ground, it 
is easier to articulate points of disagreement and to avoid situations where creators, users 
and critics of measures talk past each other. 
After outlining Representation Minimalism (section 2), I will use the literature 
on RTM to show that Representation Minimalism avoids many of the worries that scholars 
have had about the conception of representation that RTM is taken to advocate. I 
emphasised “taken to advocate”, because it is my view that RTM is often misunderstood 
by its critics. Indeed, I will argue that when RTM is appropriately interpreted, RTM and 
Representation Minimalism are allies, not alternatives (section 3). Finally, I defend 
representation minimalism against some of the problems critics have diagnosed with RTM, 
i.e. its ambiguity about the ontology of empirical relations and its alleged incompatibility 
with measurement practices (sections 4 and 5, respectively). Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Representation Minimalism 
Scales in measurement practice 
Consider an assignment of numerals to types of minerals: 
Quartz ← 7 
Calcite ← 3. 
The assignment consists of completely useless uninterpreted symbols unless we know 
what the symbols are meant to represent or be informative of. The user of these numerals 
                                                        
1 By “measuring a concept” I mean numerically representing the denotation of that concept, i.e. an attribute 
or a property of an entity.  
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wants to know (at least) two things before she allows herself to interpret the numerals as 
meaningful measurement results. First, what attribute do the numerals pertain to? Do they 
indicate the weight or surface temperature or hardness or something else entirely? 
Second: what measurement scale are we dealing with? This section will focus on this latter 
question. The notion of scale is a crucial tool for explicating measurement-relevant 
representation, which is why we need to familiarize ourselves with it. 
Scales are part and parcel of the conceptual and statistical toolbox of 
measurement. Hence, scales are introduced in most textbooks and introductory courses 
on social scientific measurement (Embretson & Reise, 2000; Fiske, 1971; Howell, 2010; 
Kline, 1998; Lord & Novick, 1968; Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994; Osherson & Lane, 2018). But 
more familiar attributes from physical sciences, weight, temperature and hardness, are 
simpler cases for illustrating the most common measurement scale types, which were 
originally distinguished by psychophysicist S. S. Stevens (1946).2 The following paragraph 
provides (what I take to be) an uncontroversial, broad brushstrokes account of how scale 
types are usually treated.  
Our familiarity with weight measurement tells us that if the numbers indicate 
weight measured in grams, we can say, for example, that the ratio of the quartz sample’s 
weight to that of the calcite sample is 2.3. In measurement jargon, we say that such 
comparisons are meaningful because weight is measured on a ratio scale. By contrast, we 
know from everyday usage of temperature scales that it is not sensible to say that the ratio 
of the temperature of the quartz sample to the temperature of the calcite sample is 2.3, 
when both are measured in centigrade. We could, however, compare the ratio of the 
difference between the temperatures of the two samples to the difference between the 
temperatures of some other two samples. In the language of measurement theory, we say 
that such comparisons are meaningful because the measurements are on an interval scale. 
Finally, if the numerals are measurements of mineral hardness on the less familiar Mohs 
hardness scale, the only thing the numerals are informative of is ordering. Quartz is harder 
than calcite, we can say, knowing that it has been assigned a higher value. But based on 
measurements on Mohs hardness scale, we know nothing about how much harder quartz 
is. That is because Mohs hardness scale for minerals is an ordinal scale.  
                                                        
2 There are alternative classifications of scale types. See e.g. Velleman and Wilkinson (1993). 
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These crude characterizations should be uncontroversial and acceptable to 
most scientists and philosophers who deal with measurement scales. It is also widely 
accepted that different scale types tend to allow for different arithmetic and statistical 
operations, although there is disagreement on how strict one should be regarding these 
rules (Borgatta & Bohrnstedt, 1980; Luce, Krantz, Suppes, & Tversky, 1990; Stevens, 1951; 
Velleman & Wilkinson, 1993). Many social scientists and statisticians agree that one 
cannot, for example, sensibly take the mean of ordinal values or meaningfully add ordinal 
values to each other. Another example: in empirical social sciences, undergraduates must 
learn by heart that ordinal variables require a Spearman correlation test while Pearson 
correlation test can only be applied to variables measured on an interval or a ratio scale. It 
must immediately be added that the “rules” for identifying permissible statistical tests 
based on scale type are constantly debated and even more often broken. But for now, it 
suffices to remember that scale types set some constraints on what arithmetic and 
statistical operations can be fruitfully applied to measurement results. 
I think it is appropriate to say, based on the foregoing, that scales are typically 
treated as representational assumptions. For example, when they pertain to the attribute 
weight measured on a ratio scale, the numbers 7 and 3 (from the previous example) 
represent the empirically established fact that in some situation of interest the quartz 
sample is 4 grams heavier than the calcite sample and that the ratio of the quartz sample’s 
weight to that of the calcite sample is 2.3. The following examples from introductory 
resources enforce that a representational reading of scales is common: 
 
 [When dealing with an ordinal measure of stress] we do not assume, for 
example, that the difference between 10 and 15 points represents the same 
difference in stress as the difference between 15 and 20 points. Distinctions of 
that sort must be left to interval scales. (Howell, 2010, p. 7 emphasis added). 
 
Interval scales are numerical scales in which intervals have the same 
interpretation throughout. As an example, consider the Fahrenheit scale of 
temperature. The difference between 30 degrees and 40 degrees represents the 
same temperature difference as the difference between 80 degrees and 90 
degrees. (Osherson & Lane, 2018, emphasis added) 
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The common reading of scales, then, is that claims about scale types are 
claims about representation – e.g. “Measure M represents attribute A on scale S”. The next 
section capitalizes on this notion of scales to explicate the kind of representation 
measurement requires. 
 
Representation Minimalism – a definition of measurement-relevant representation 
Consider the following definition: 
 
Representation Minimalism (ReM). In measurement, a numerical representation is 
appropriate when specified relations in the representing numerical system mirror 
empirical relations between entities, when entities are considered in terms of the target 
attribute.  
 
As with many philosophical theories of scientific representation, this 
definition of representation capitalizes on the detection of structural similarity. The need 
for structural similarity is captured in the requirement that relations in the representing 
numerical system mirror empirical relations between entities. In other words, the relations 
that exist between numbers that are assigned to entities need to be similar to the relations 
that exist between those entities. For example, ordering of numerals should mirror 
ordering of entities, equalities of numbers should mirror equalities in the degree to which 
two entities possess a property, and so on, where the italicized words designate what 
structural aspects of the numerical system and the empirical system are similar to each 
other. 
Of course, a general definition of representation in terms of similarity is 
notoriously elusive, not least because “everything is similar to everything else” in some 
respects (Isaac, 2013; cf. McLendon, 1955). To avoid a trivial definition of representation, 
one must say something about the kinds of similarities that are relevant for representation. 
Fortunately, in the measurement context, common scale types allow us to enumerate 
some similarity relations that are useful for representation without recourse to a general 
definition. The most common, measurement-relevant mirrorings are ones where: i) order 
relations between numbers mirror order relations between entities (ordinal scales), ii) 
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(in)equalities of differences between numbers mirror (in)equalities of differences between 
entities (interval scales), and iii) (in)equalities of ratios of numbers mirror (in)equalities of 
ratios of entities (ratio scales) when entities are considered in terms of some attribute. 
These similarity relations are useful in virtue of being intuitive and recognizable to most 
people who are involved in measurement activities and who are therefore familiar with 
scales. There are other scale classifications and thus other interesting and potentially useful 
measurement-related mirrorings. For the purposes of the present discussion, the most 
common scale types suffice though.  
The term “specified” is important in the definition: A numerical 
representation is appropriate when specified relations in the representing numerical system 
mirror empirical relations between entities. Its role is to signal that, while different kinds of 
similarity relations (e.g. ordering, inequality and equality of differences) can justifiably 
underwrite measurement-relevant representation, it is important to be explicit about the 
relations a particular numerical assignment mirrors. On their own, numbers lure us to apply 
familiar operations such as addition and calculation of averages. But in measurement, the 
results of these operations only have a meaning if the numbers have a specific mirroring 
relation to the entities that are of interest to the measurer. For example, the average of 
numerals that signal mere ordering has no empirical interpretation – if you assign numbers 
1 to 10 to 10 children according to their relative heights and take the average of those 
numbers, the resulting number has nothing to do with the average height of the children. 
Hence, for the numerical representation to be appropriate, one must be clear about what 
similarity relations are being represented. The relevant relations need to be specified. 
Consider now the part of the definition of ReM that reads: when entities are 
considered in terms of the target attribute. Recall from earlier that a purportedly 
measurement-relevant numerical assignment raises (at least) two questions: one about 
scale and one about the attribute the numerical assignment pertains to. If ReM neglected 
to mention attributes, its usage might lead to the following situation. Consider the 
following information about three individuals, A, B and C, and their orderings in terms of 




Height C ≻ B ≻ A ≺ C 
Weight A ≻ B ≻ C ≺ A 
  
With a definition lacking any mention of attributes, the following numerical 
assignment might be said to be an appropriate, measurement-relevant representation: A  
← 2, C ← 3, B ← 1.3 Such a numerical assignment would mirror the following order relations: 
C is taller than A and B, and A is heavier than B. But the representation is odd and difficult 
to interpret. We would typically not consider such a representation appropriate. 
 By mentioning the target attribute in the definition of ReM I have tried to 
fend off such interpretational difficulties. But what are target attributes and what is it for 
entities to be considered in terms of such an attribute? 4 I propose that at minimum, there 
must be a unified characterization of the target attribute that applies to all the represented 
relations between entities. For example, say someone has represented some relation 
between Tim, Tam and Tom with ordered numbers 3, 2, and 1. The demand for a unified 
characterization means that if the numbers 2 and 1 signal a difference in height, then all 
other pairings of numbers must also signal differences in height. 
This condition is meant to eliminate the kind of uninterpretable hodgepodge 
representations that we saw in the previous example, where some numerical relations 
reflected height and others weight. The problem with such representations is that the user 
of the numerical representation cannot read the numerical relations in terms of the 
intended empirical relations, because any given pair of numerals could pertain to weight 
or height. To avoid this kind of underdetermination, the target attribute must be 
characterized so that each pair of numerals represents the same attribute. This condition 
is still extremely permissive. Under it, acceptable characterizations would include e.g. 
height measured by eyeballing, total score on personality test T, the ratio of an individual’s 
body temperature to the length of their eyebrow, and so on. 
In addition, the target attribute must be the attribute or feature the user of 
the measurement instrument is interested in – hence the word “target”. For example, it 
won’t do to tell me to consider relations between entities using a ruler, if the attribute I 
                                                        
3 The numerals designate orderings, such that a higher number designates the heavier/taller individual and 
an equal number designates equal height/weight. 
4 For philosophical literature on properties, see Galluzzo and Loux (2015); Marmodoro and Yates (2016).  
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am interested in is depression (and no advice is given on how to read the ruler in terms of 
depression rather than length). This is because as a measure-user, I am unlikely to accept 
the ruler as pertaining to the attribute I am interested in, i.e. depression. 
These conditions for delineating the target attribute are human-dependant:  
it is up to us to formulate a unified characterization of an attribute and to decide whether 
the characterization captures the attribute of interest. The point of these conditions is not 
to imply that attributes are human-dependent, but rather to ensure the minimality of the 
resulting definition of representation. Formulated this way, we ensure that realists and 
anti-realists can buy in to the same definition of representation. Their disagreement will 
show up as a divergence in the kinds of things they accept as target attributes, as we will 
see in more detail in section 4. 
Taking ReM literally would mean that almost no current measurement 
procedure, whether in physics or psychology or anywhere in between, provides an 
appropriate representation. This is because ReM is silent about mistakes and measurement 
error. Due to random and systematic error, the numbers our measurement procedures 
yield never perfectly mirror empirical relations (unless they do so by definition but let us 
not get in to that here). We might also interpret evidence wrong and be mistaken about a 
hypothesized mirroring. To take these challenges into account, we would have to modify 
ReM to something like this: 
 
ReMEvidence. In measurement, we can tentatively accept a numerical representation as 
appropriate when we have evidence that specified relations in the representing numerical 
system mirror empirical relations between entities to an acceptable degree of accuracy, 
when entities are considered in terms of the target attribute.  
 
Now, because this definition is a mouthful and not very user-friendly, I am going to 
categorize measurement error and mistakes as silent background assumptions. Thus, ReM 
should be read as a characterization of the kind of representation measurement aims for, 
but the attainment of which measurement error and mistakes prevent to varying degrees. 
Figure 1 summarizes the resulting notion of measurement-relevant 
representation, explaining its key components. The definition is minimalist in many ways, 
and I have therefore called it Representation Minimalism (ReM). What I mean by 
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minimalism is that the definition sets minimal constraints on the required representation 
– this is what measurement requires at minimum, although it might (be argued to) require 
a lot more in addition. First, ReM says nothing about the exact relations that need to be 
mirrored. What matters is that the relations are specified and consistently used, not that 
they are, for example, all and only the relations that interval and ratio scales are taken to 
represent. Second, ReM is minimalist regarding the kinds of attributes that are 
represented: it is not tied to a realist or any other metaphysical stance regarding attributes. 
Such minimalism does not mean that realists or proponents of other metaphysical views 
(concerning attributes) cannot commit to ReM. To the contrary, ReM sets minimal 
constraints for measurement-relevant representation, which the metaphysically-inclined 
may supplement as they see fit. 
I believe that ReM is a necessary condition for measurement across the 
sciences, and the rest of this paper is dedicated to defending ReM as such. But ReM is likely 
not a sufficient condition for measurement. A full-blown account of measurement would 
likely specify how entities and the measurement instrument (causally) interact in order to 
produce an adequate representation (Cartwright et al., 2016). This paper does not attempt 
such a general account, although in section 5 I will argue that ReM is compatible with 
common measure validation practices. Before that, a few words on the relationship 













ReM. A numerical representation is appropriate when specified relations in the representing numerical system mirror empirical relations 






Mirroring denotes structural 
similarities between the representing 
numerical system and the represented  
empirical system.  
Minimal, necessary criteria for something to count as the target attribute: 
-To ensure interpretability: a unified characterization of the target attribute that applies to all represented relations 
-To ensure relevance: the user of the measure must accept it as pertaining to the attribute of interest 
Figure 1. A summary of Representation Minimalism. 
Scale types capture relations (e.g. 
ordering) that are familiar and 
useful in measurement contexts. 
Background assumption: In practice, ReM is realized to varying degrees of accuracy and uncertainty 




3. ReM and RTM 
Mathematics of scales 
The Representational Theory of Measurement (RTM) is the most ambitious attempt to theorize 
measurement-relevant representation. One might think that by proposing a new definition of 
measurement-relevant representation, I am implying that RTM is a bad theory and that it should be 
replaced by the one I propose. But the way I – along many other measurement scholars – interpret 
RTM means that RTM and ReM are not two competing answers to the same philosophical question. 
In my view, RTM gives us formal tools for evaluating whether or not a given numerical 
representation of a given phenomenon is appropriate. ReM, on the other hand, is a more general 
definition of what measurement-relevant representation requires at minimum in any context.  
In this section I am going to explicate the relationship between RTM and ReM in more 
detail. A thorough explication is needed for two reasons. Firstly, as the philosophical literature on 
measurement is growing, it is important to keep track of the relations between various theories. 
This prevents people from seeing controversy where there is none. This is especially important in 
this case, since I use the criticisms levelled against RTM to show that ReM does not fall prey to these 
objections, which might give the impression that RTM and ReM are rivals. Secondly, by outlining the 
way ReM and RTM can serve related but different functions, I underline that under certain 
interpretations, RTM too is a relevant theory of measurement. More specifically, I think that when 
RTM is interpreted as a formal theory of numerical representability, not as a theory of how to go 
about measuring, it too can serve useful functions without falling prey to objections commonly 
levelled against it. But before we get to the relations between ReM and RTM, a brief recap of the 
central aspects of RTM is in order. 
According to the authors of Foundations of Measurement, where RTM received its 
canonical expression, measurement involves “the construction of homomorphisms [..] from 
empirical relational structures of interest to numerical structures that are useful.” (Krantz et al. 
1971, 9). In mathematics, homomorphisms are many-to-one mappings from sets to other sets. In 
RTM, these mappings are established between specific types of sets, that is, the mappings relate 
empirical relational structures to numerical (relational) structures. Foundational measurement 
theorists commonly distinguish between four types of homomorphisms: ratio, interval, ordinal and 
nominal. As one can guess, types of homomorphisms are in fact what we have previously called 
scales.  
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I have already said that informally, differences between scales can be thought of as 
differences in what information the numbers (numerals) represent about the targets of 
measurement. But formally, different scales i.e. homomorphisms are characterized by the types of 
transformations they allow, that is, what are the rules for changing the numbers in a given numerical 
assignment. Ordinal scales, such as Mohs hardness scale for minerals, allow monotonic increasing 
transformations of the form ϕ→f(ϕ), where f is “a strictly increasing real-valued function of a real 
variable” (Krantz et al. 1971, 11). These transformations are permissible, because a rule-bindingly 
transformed numerical assignment continues to represent the same empirical relational system as 
the original numerical assignment.5 For example, if we are dealing with the ordinal Mohs hardness 
scale, the numerals in the numerical assignment 
Quartz ← 7,  
Calcite ← 3 
could be transformed by adding 2 to both numbers or multiplying them by 2, and the resulting 
numerical assignments would continue to mirror the structure ordinal scales are informative of, 
namely, ordering relations between entities (i.e. quartz would continue to be assigned a higher 
value which corresponds to the fact that it is harder). For interval scales, e.g. temperature measured 
in degrees Celsius or degrees Fahrenheit, the permissible transformations are of the form ϕ→αϕ+b, 
α>0. Ratio scales, such as length and weight, allow for multiplicative transformation of the form 
ϕ→αϕ, α>0. These latter two scales are also called quantitative scales. 
So far, I have largely re-described the content of the previous section in the more 
technical and rigorous language of RTM. The core idea of RTM that we have not yet explored is that 
in order for relations between entities to be measured on a specific scale, those empirical relations 
have to fulfil certain constraints. RTM states these constraints in axioms. For example, the axioms 
that pertain to an ordinal scale are:  
 
Let A be a finite set of objects, and ≽ a binary relation on A. The relational structure (≽,A) can be 
meaningfully represented on an ordinal scale, iff for all a, b, c  ∈A, 
 
1. Connectedness: Either a ≽ b or b ≽ a, and 
2. Transitivity: If a ≽ b and b ≽ c, then a ≽ c. 
                                                        
5 Those versed in the technical literature might find the terms “transformation rules” and “meaningfulness” helpful in 
this context. I shall not introduce the terms here because I want to give an accessible gloss of RTM. 
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For example: the set A of objects denotes a set of minerals, and the relation ≽ denotes a relation in 
terms of hardness, i.e. a ≽ b is interpreted as “a is at least as hard as b”.  
Where do such constraints come from? The above claim about axioms of ordinal 
measurement, just like other axiomatizations in RTM, are backed up by theorems. In fact, proofs of 
two types of theorems fill the pages of Foundations of Measurement and other publications in the 
RTM tradition. A representation theorem establishes that if (sometimes if and only if) a given 
empirical relational structure of interest satisfies certain (non-contradictory) axioms, such as the 
ones described above, then a homomorphism ϕ to a certain numerical structure can be established. 
A uniqueness theorem establishes the permissible transformations of ϕ that also yield a 
homomorphism to the same numerical structure. In other words, the uniqueness theorem 
determines the scale type of the numerical assignment.  
For example: if the hardness relation ≽ satisfies connectedness and transitivity, then 
one can prove a representation theorem: there is a function ϕ from A to the set of real numbers 
such that for all minerals a and b in A, a ≽ b iff ϕ(a)≥ ϕ(b). In informal terms, what is proven is that 
the hardness relation ≽ holds between a and b if and only if the number associated with a is greater 
than or equal to the number associated to b. Another function ϕ' has the same property and thus 
constitutes a homomorphism to the same numerical structure as ϕ iff there is a strictly increasing 
function f such that for all a in A, ϕ' (a)= f[ϕ(a)]. In informal terms, in this case ϕ' is a permissible 
transformation of ϕ as long as it preserves the order of the numbers assigned to the objects. The 
upshot of the proofs is that mineral hardness can be represented on an ordinal scale. 
 
The role of formal theory in representation 
As noted in the introduction, multiple controversies surround RTM. Some contributors, for example, 
seem to think that RTM provides an account of how to go about measuring in practice, e.g. how to 
validate a measure or how to confirm scale type assumptions. More concretely, some scholars argue 
that RTM requires direct observations of relations that perfectly satisfy the relevant axioms (Angner, 
2011; Borsboom, 2005; Mari, 2005; e.g. Michell, 1986).6 From the observation that most successful 
measurement practices make no reference to direct observations or the fulfilment of axioms, it is 
then concluded that RTM is simply wrong about what successful measurement requires.  
                                                        
6 Borsboom (2005, ch. 4) eventually ends up characterizing RTM as a rational reconstruction of the measurement 
process, therefore departing from the observation-tied interpretation he first assigns to RTM. 
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I think this critique of RTM does not hold water. This is because the critics have an 
incorrect, or at least an unfruitful interpretation of RTM. In my view, RTM is a formal theory of 
numerical representability: it tells us about the axiomatic conditions that guarantee the 
appropriateness of a certain numerical representation. RTM is silent about how to go about 
establishing that these conditions hold in a particular context, not because it is a bad theory, but 
simply because it was not meant to answer that question. Since various authors have defended this 
position elsewhere, I shall not dwell on the matter here (Baccelli, 2020; Decoene, Onghena, & 
Janssen, 1995; Heilmann, 2015; Narens & Luce, 1993). 
If RTM is treated as an account of the formal requirements of numerical 
representability, then RTM and Representation Minimalism are closely connected. In fact, RTM 
provides rigorous characterizations of the kinds of mirroring relations ReM requires. ReM relies on 
scale types to enumerate measurement-relevant mirrorings. RTM, by contrast, provides the 
conditions under which representations on a certain scale type are possible. That is, with its 
representation and uniqueness theorems RTM shows what kinds of empirical systems can be 
represented with a structure-informative numerical system, that continues to be informative of 
relevant structures under specific transformations on the numerical system. In short, RTM is the 
formal, definitional grounding of scale type assumptions. 
To illustrate RTM’s foundational role in characterizing scales, consider the transitivity 
condition, which RTM sets as a requirement for a structure to be represented on an ordinal scale. 
As the biconditional formulation of the axiom indicates, it is simply not possible to assign order-
informative numbers to relations that violate the transitivity axiom. For example, consider a 
situation in which, for whatever way we measure and conceive of preference, Maya has strict 
preferences for Sacher cake over Pavlova, Pavlova over Black Forest and Black Forest over Sacher. 
It is evident that every assignment of numerals to cakes that attempts to capture that system of 
(strict!) order relations will fail, that is, at least one of the preference relations is not mirrored by 
the ordering of the assigned numerals. Our colloquial interpretation of ordinal scales as informative 
of order would not get off the ground without transitivity. This is how RTM provides the foundations 
of scale type assumptions.  
Similarly, claims about interval or ratio measurement imply that a set of axioms holds, 
where those axioms can be proven to be jointly sufficient for constructing the relevant 
homomorphism. Notice though that for interval and ratio scale measurement, various 
axiomatizations are possible. In other words, there can be meaningful interval (ratio) level 
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measurement of two attributes, even though the empirical relational systems they correspond to 
are different in some respects.  
We can summarize the connection between RTM and ReM in the following three 
observations: 
  
1. Representation Minimalism is defined in terms of mirrorings. 
2. Scale types denote different kinds of mirrorings. 
3. RTM provides formal foundations of scales. 
 
From these conceptual links between relational structures, scales and mirrorings, we see that RTM 
provides formal foundations of ReM. The relevance of this ReM-RTM connection is that RTM-style 
axiomatizations can be used to evaluate the fulfilment of the requirements of Representation 
Minimalism. For example, if we are looking for evidence regarding representation of order relations, 
RTM gives us the transitivity and completeness axioms as empirical criteria. If there is empirical 
evidence for the fulfilment of transitivity and completeness, then there is evidence for the fulfilment 
of requirements of Representation Minimalism (in so far as the specified relations mentioned in 
ReM are indeed order relations).  
 This rendition of the relationship between ReM and RTM might give rise to the 
question: why do we need ReM if a particular interpretation of RTM already gives us the idea of 
numerical representability and a thorough system of theorems establishing the conditions of 
appropriate numerical representation? One way to think of ReM is that it is an extension of a 
particular interpretation of RTM, i.e. that ReM supplements RTM by engaging with questions that 
RTM has thus far not dealt with. These questions have to do with the role of error in establishing 
numerical representation (discussed in section 2 above), the nature of attributes and empirical 
relations (section 2 and 4) and the role of laws and models in validating numerical representations 
(section 5 below). While I think this would be an acceptable framing, due to the controversies 
surrounding the nature of RTM I prefer to think of ReM as an independent account of representation 
rather than as an extension of RTM. In other words, to avoid getting in to debates about what the 
founders of RTM meant by this-or-that phrase, I prefer to treat ReM as an account of representation 
that is compatible with certain interpretations of RTM, whether or not those interpretations where 
the ones intended by the authors of Foundations of Measurement. 
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Having now carved out the relationship between RTM and Representation 
Minimalism, we can move on to other concerns. RTM has evoked at least two kinds of criticisms. On 
the one hand, there is the worry that RTM fails to make sense of actual, successful measurement 
practices (e.g. Reiss 2008; Mari et al. 2017). On the other hand, the exact nature of the concept 
“empirical relation” is ambiguous. These worries can be easily rewritten as challenges to 
Representation Minimalism. The rest of this paper will outline how Representation Minimalism 
deals with these two worries. 
 
4. What are empirical relations? 
One of the controversies surrounding RTM has to do with the exact nature of empirical relations. 
Are empirical relations real, measurement-independent patterns in the world that are merely 
revealed by measurement instruments? Or is the act of measuring in some sense constitutive of the 
relevant empirical relations? Should empirical relations be directly observable or can they be 
inferred from observations? (e.g. Angner, 2013; Vessonen, 2020) Representation Minimalism is non-
committal in this regard. It only says that the relevant empirical relations have to be expressed in 
terms of an attribute that is of interest to the measure user and the relations have to have a unified 
characterization. The choice between types of empirical relations is determined by how the 
attribute of interest is conceptualized by the intended user of the measure. This way of delineating 
relevant relations is rare – in fact, I have not seen it laid out in this way anywhere else. In this section 
I will introduce some common readings of permissible empirical relations and relate them to ReM. 
In the minimalist spirit, I argue that ReM is neutral with respect to different ways of specifying 
empirical relations. 
Consider, as an example, the Apgar score that quickly summarizes aspects of the 
health of an infant. At one minute and five minutes after delivery, the midwife or the doctor assesses 
five easily identifiable characteristics of the baby – heart rate, respiratory effort, muscle tone, reflex 
irritability, and colour – assigning a value of 0 to 2 to each characteristic and summing up the scores. 
Total scores of 7-10 denote good condition, while scores under 7 are thought to indicate that the 
baby might need urgent medical attention. This prediction is based on prior observations of the 
frequency with which infants that fall within a specific range of scores suffer from some serious 
health problems (such as brain damage). For example, studies show that the incidence of neonatal 
death is much higher among infants that are assigned scores 0 to 3 as compared to infants who are 
assigned scores 7 to 10 (e.g. Casey, McIntire, & Leveno, 2001).  
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Does the numerical assignment Apgar score yields fulfil the requirement of 
measurement-relevant representation? The answer depends on what you take permissible 
empirical relations to be in the measurement context. In what follows I will go over some 
alternatives as to what Apgar score might be taken to represent, and problems with each 
alternative. I am not arguing that this or that interpretation is the correct way to read the Apgar 
score. I use the Apgar score merely to illustrate what kinds of relations numerical assignments might 
be taken to represent. I then show that my notion of representation, Representation Minimalism, 
is neutral with respect to these alternatives.  
One might argue that the Apgar score represents empirical relations in terms of the 
attribute “what numbers get assigned when following the rules of the Apgar scoring system”. For 
example, if baby Mia is assigned a “6” and baby Aija is assigned an “8”, this represents the empirical 
relation that Mia received a lower score than Aija when they are assessed in terms of the rules of 
the Apgar scoring system. We might call this the operationalist reading of empirical relations: the 
numerical relational system represents the test procedure – the operation! – that yielded those 
numbers. One of the main problems with this approach is that measure-users are typically not 
interested in the procedure in and of itself, but only as far as it indicates some underlying, 
independent or “real” attribute of interest. 
To contrast the operationalist reading, one might insist on (some version of) realism 
about empirical relations.7 On this approach, it is not enough for the numerical structure to 
represent the procedure that produced the numbers. Instead, the numerical structure should 
represent empirical relations that exist independent of the testing procedure. For example, 
according to the realist, the Apgar score represents (or should represent) relations between infants 
in terms of health, illness or well-being, where health, illness and well-being are something that 
exist independent of the testing procedure. The realist would typically insist that what needs to be 
represented is relations that bring about or cause the testing procedure to yield the numbers it 
yields. For example, the test-independent health status of Mia and Aija is what causes the test 
procedure to assign an “8” to Aija and a “6” to Mia. The main problem with the realist reading is 
that it is difficult to determine whether the Apgar score tracks a plausible conception of health, 
illness or well-being. 
                                                        
7 Wolff (2019), for instance, provides a compelling case for perspectival realism regarding measurement-related 
representation. 
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We have seen the realist and the operationalist interpretation of measurement-
related empirical relations. Are there others? In between realism and operationalism, one might 
insist, is another position: the relations that the numerical structure represents are the real, 
observed properties, such as skin colour and muscle tone, that the doctor or midwife reports with 
the Apgar score. Call this the phenomenological reading of empirical relations:8 the numerical 
structure represents relations in terms of immediate observations, which get reported via the Apgar 
scoring system.9 The main reason I will not consider the phenomenological reading here is that it 
does not really count as a representation, that is, relations in the numerical structure cannot be 
interpreted or read in terms of relations in the empirical system. For example, the numbers that are 
assigned to Mia and Aija are not readily interpretable in terms of immediate observations, even 
though those numbers where assigned based on observations. The reason is that the difference in 
Aija’s and Mia’s respective scores could be due to a difference in observed muscle tone, or skin 
colour, or a combination of these, or a great many other combinations of observed properties. 
Similarly, if Mia and Aija received the same score “6”, that would not be interpretable as 
representing the fact that Mia and Aija have a similar status in terms of observed properties. If the 
numerical assignment does not represent observed properties of the children, but is merely a 
product of considering those observations, it is not apt to consider this an approach to 
representation. 
Another suggestion might be that alongside the operationalist and the realist 
interpretations, we should consider a predictive reading of empirical relations. For example, the 
Apgar score allows doctors and midwives to predict which infants are likely in need of urgent 
medical attention. The prediction is done based on experience and empirical data on the incidence 
of neonatal death, brain damage and other conditions in cohorts of babies that have been assigned 
a specific score. On these grounds, one might propose a predictive reading of empirical relations: 
what the numerical structure represents is (probabilistic) relations between infants in terms of their 
likelihood of suffering brain damage or another serious medical problem.  
                                                        
8 The difference between the operationalist and the phenomenological reading is subtle. The operationalist says that 
the Apgar score represents relations between infants, when infants are compared in terms of the rules of the Apgar 
scoring system. The phenomonologist says that the test score represents relations between infants in terms of skin 
color, muscle tone and so on. On the phenomenological reading, we should be able to say how two infants differ in 
observed muscle tone when we see that they have been assigned scores 8 and 6, respectively. But clearly we are not 
justified in saying that. In the operationalist approach, we are merely saying that two infants differ in terms of their 
Apgar scores, which is obviously true. 
9 Borsboom’s constructivist reading of RTM (2005) could be thought of as similar to what I call the phenomenological 
reading here. As is evident from discussions above, I deny that RTM is committed to this reading of empirical relations. 
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I think this reading can have useful functions but should not be considered an 
alternative to the realist and the operationalist readings. This is because the predictive reading 
always piggybacks on either the operationalist or the realist reading, depending on what kinds of 
empirical relations are being predicted. In the Apgar score case, what is predicted is a test-
independent attribute such as brain damage or death. In other cases, operationally characterized 
attributes might be predicted, for example, if one uses Facebook posts to predict scores on a 
depression test (and that depression test is interpreted as representing test-dependent, i.e. 
operational relations). Under the predictive reading, then, a numerical structure is a representation 
of the likelihood of the occurrence of given realistically or operationally characterized empirical 
relations. The adequacy of a particular predictive reading therefore largely depends on the 
adequacy of the relevant realistic or operational reading, which is why I shall not consider predictive 
reading of empirical relations as an approach of its own.10 
The operationalists and the realists frequently argue about the relative supremacy of 
each position (Lovett & Hood, 2011; Maul, Torres Irribarra, & Wilson, 2016; on the opposition in 
psychometrics, see e.g. Michell, 2008). Some debates about the appropriate interpretation of RTM 
can be recast as debates about whether RTM is a realist or an operationalist approach. On the one 
hand, the fact that Krantz et al. (ch. 1 in 1971) used length as the prime example in their explication 
of RTM suggests the operational reading (or phenomenological reading),11 on the other hand the 
three volumes of Foundations of measurement are littered with critical remarks about 
operationalism (especially chapter 1 of Volume 1 and chapter 22 of Volume 3).  
The beauty of Representation Minimalism is that it does not hinge on a commitment 
to any of these positions. This is a virtue, because the point of a minimal account is to offer common 
ground for debates. Representation Minimalism takes both the operationalist approach and the 
realist approach on board by characterizing measurement-relevant representation in terms of an 
attribute that is of interest to the measure-user. If the measure-user is a realist, the representational 
capacities of a measure will impress them only if the measure yields a numerical structure that 
represents “realistically” characterized empirical relations. If the measure-user is an operationalist, 
                                                        
10 Here I dealt with the idea that a numerical structure may be taken to represent predicted operationalist or realist 
relations. There is, of course, also the case where a numerical assignment represents some operationalist or realist 
relations and is simultaneously predictive of other operationalist or realist relations. I mention this distinction here just 
to clarify the various alternatives one might consider. 
11 The founder of operationalism (or at least its most famous champion) Percy Bridgman also used length as the 
showcase of operational analysis (Chang, 2009). The fact that length is a key example for both the operationalists and 
the RTM proponents may invite the interpretation that the two are the same or very similar approaches.  
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the representational capacities of a measure will impress them only if the numerical structure 
represents operational empirical relations.  
 
5. Models, minimalism and validation practice  
RTM has been criticized for its failure to make sense of actual, successful measurement practices 
(e.g. Reiss 2008; Mari et al 2017). Critics note that when researchers create, validate and use 
measures, they make no mention of axioms, which is why the mathematical focus of RTM seems to 
fit poorly with actual measurement practice. A similar objection could be carved against ReM: when 
researchers successfully validate a measure, in particular their quantitative scale type assumptions, 
they make no reference to mirrorings. Hence characterizing measurement-relevant representation 
in terms of mirrorings must be wrong-headed. In this section I want to show why claiming that ReM 
is a necessary condition of measurement is compatible with the observation that successful 
measure validation practices indeed make no mention of mirrorings or mappings, let alone axioms.  
How does one confirm scale type assumptions in practice? We can begin to look for 
answers in historical accounts of successful measure validation. Those histories rarely feature 
axioms. Rather, they involve theorizing and empirically testing law-like associations between 
attributes. A law-like association here means, roughly, a mathematically expressible, reasonably 
stable relation between the target attribute (A) and other attributes of interest (I): A = f(I1, I2, I3, … 
In). In psychology and social sciences, such a mathematical expression of a stable relationship 
between target and other (indicator) attributes is called a measurement model (see e.g. Embretson 
and Reise 2000). I will use this conception of a measurement model to explicate two types of 
approaches to the confirmation of scale type assumptions: the direct axiom-based approach (DAB) 
and the indirect measurement model-based approach (IMM). I illustrate the two ways of confirming 
scale type assumptions with reference to temperature measurement.12 Finally, I connect DAB and 
IMM to Representation Minimalism, showing that both approaches to scale type confirmation are 
compatible with Representation Minimalism. This way, I show that even though mirrorings are 
typically not mentioned in measurement practice, the practice of scale type confirmation still 
implicitly aims for and achieves the kind of representation Representation Minimalism requires. 
                                                        
12 The distinction between ways of confirming scale type assumptions is explicated here for the first time, but I rely 
heavily on Chang’s (2004) account of the historical development of temperature measurement to explicate the 
distinction. 
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When the developers of temperature measurement had achieved ordinal 
measurement on so-called thermoscopes, their ambitions to improve towards quantitative 
measurement did not direct them to axiomatic measurement theory. Rather, the focus was on the 
mathematical form of the law that governs the association between temperature and other relevant 
attributes, most importantly the association between temperature and the volume of an indicator 
substance, such as mercury, that fills the tube of a thermometer-to-be (under specified auxiliary 
conditions, e.g. pressure) (Chang 2004, ch. 2). The hypothesized model, a linear relationship 
between temperature and the volume of the indicator substance, achieved support gradually and 
abductively through a combination of theorizing and experimenting (the details of this process do 
not concern us here). The theorizing and experimentation eventually justified the inference that 
temperature could be measured on an interval scale with an instrument that is filled with the 
relevant indicator substance (when the instrument’s cross-sectional area is constant).  
Why do (approximate) confirmations of such measurement models afford inferences 
to measurability on a quantitative scale? Superficially, a confirmation of the linear relationship 
between two numerical systems (sets of numbers), one called “volume” and one called 
“temperature”, immediately ensures that the possible numerical assignments to levels of 
temperature are all linearly related to each other – it could not be otherwise if the linearity of the 
relation between numerical systems associated with temperature and volume is established. But to 
comply with our full characterization of scale type assumptions, we need something more 
substantial than the relation between two numerical systems: we need mappings from the 
permissible numerical systems to empirical relations. What does the confirmation of the 
measurement model have to be like in order for it to allow inferences of numerical-empirical 
mappings? In the case of temperature, what allows us to say that differences between numbers 
assigned map onto differences between entities in terms of temperature? 
Notice first that in the case of temperature, the indicator attribute volume is known 
to be quantitative. Why? That volume is quantitative may seem trivial, and in fact people have 
treated volume as a quantitative attribute for millennia, because it is so intuitive to do so. But I will 
probe the foundations of those intuitions a little further here, since understanding the quantitative 
nature of volume will help me explain why confirmation of (some) measurement models affords 
inferences to scale types.  
Loosely speaking, we know that the attribute volume is quantitative because we can 
readily observe that its subsystems are additive. That is to say, if we divide an entity in to parts, the 
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volume of the whole entity is always the sum of the volumes of the parts of the entity. (Such 
attributes are sometimes called “extensive” as opposed to “intensive” in the measurement 
literature.) Knowing this, we can mentally map the arithmetical operation of addition onto additive 
empirical operations involving the attribute volume. And recall that addition is a meaningful 
operation only for quantitative scales.  
Such a chain of inference is, of course, a coarse-grained justification for the possibility 
of quantification. But it resonates well with mathematical measurement theories and exemplifies 
the core of more rigorous empirical approaches that proceed directly from RTM-style axioms. In the 
coarse-grained justification, one compares entities in terms of direct observations of the target 
attribute (e.g. how the volume of parts relates to the volume of the whole) and maps the observed 
relations to relations and operations on numbers (e.g. how two numbers relate to their sum) via 
mental association. A parallel but more rigorous empirical justification of scale type assumptions 
starts from measurement theory, which, as we have seen, maps uninterpreted relational systems 
to numerical systems via mathematical proofs. An empirical researcher can then capitalize on those 
proofs in her inference to scale type, if she manages to operationalize the axiomatic constraints in 
terms of the attribute of interest, and if her observations confirm that the constraints are fulfilled, 
at least approximately. 
With this in mind, we can come back to inferences from measurement models to 
scales. To understand that inference, I think it is helpful to recast the confirmation of the linear 
relation between temperature and the volume of a thermometric substance in the following terms 
(recall, we are thinking about situations where the aim is to go beyond the superficial numerical-
system-to-numerical-system association). What is happening, in effect, is a mapping of the known 
equalities and inequalities of differences in volume with the previously unknown equalities and 
inequalities in differences in temperature. In other words, we can think of the gradual confirmation 
of a linear law-like relation between temperature and volume of a given thermometric substance 
as the search for the conditions under which equal differences in volume map onto equal 
differences in temperature, and unequal differences in volume map onto unequal differences in 
temperature. This may sound like an unnecessarily complex way of putting the simple idea of 
confirming a linear law-like relation. But put this way it is easy to understand why the confirmation 
of the measurement model allows inferences to scale type. In the case of confirming the 
quantitative nature of volume, the procedure involved mapping arithmetic operations directly on 
empirical relations. Here, by contrast, the procedure starts from the mapping of empirical relations 
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pertaining to volume to empirical relations pertaining to temperature, and only then proceeds to 
map a numerical system onto the empirical relations thus discovered. 13    
The general point of this admittedly long-winded explanation is to motivate a 
distinction between two methods of establishing scale types in practice: the direct axiom-based 
approach (DAB) and the indirect measurement model-based approach (IMM). DAB proceeds from 
the mathematical measurement theory to empirical reality by taking the axioms (or something like 
them) at face value and finding direct (that is, simple and trivially justified) observational means of 
checking whether the axioms hold when entities are compared in terms of the target attribute. The 
establishment of the quantitative nature of volume is an example. In IMM, by contrast, one specifies 
a measurement model of the target attribute and its relations to other attributes and infers the 
scale type of the target attribute via confirmation of the relationship postulated in the model. The 
establishment of the interval measurement of temperature is an example. The division between 
DAB and IMM has grey areas, because of the blurriness of the dividing line between direct, simple 
observation on the one hand and indirect, inferential means of hypothesis confirmation on the 
other. There is no reason to let such greyness and blurriness alarm us.  
It is not a novel idea that measure validation can involve something else than direct 
observations of the fulfilment of axioms. Nor is it new to claim that measures can be validated via 
modelling. For example, Tal (2012, 2016) has defined and defended what he calls the model-based 
approach to measurement with respect to time measurement, while McClimans, Browne and Cano 
(2017) apply Tal’s framework to argue that model-based considerations are central to measure 
validation in psychology. Much earlier, in 1934, psychologist Junius Flagg Brown wrote an article in 
Erkenntnis, where he analysed the validation of measures of e.g. weight, electrical potential and 
temperature in terms of the confirmation of (what in present terminology could be called) 
measurement models (because they express law-like tendencies mathematically) (Brown, 1934). If 
the claim about models in measure validation has been made some 80 years ago, what has been 
the point of this exercise? 
                                                        
13 In this example, the mapping capitalizes on the known quantitative properties of volume – the confirmation of the 
linear relation amounts, in a sense, to an extrapolation from the known quantitative properties of volume to those of 
temperature. However, it is not a general feature of model-based confirmation of scale types that one attribute must 
be known to be quantitative prior to the confirmation of the relevant measurement model. The confirmation of a Rasch 
model is an example of a model-based confirmation that does not require prior quantitative information (Vessonen, 
2020). I think this detail is not essential for the IMM/DAB distinction to do work for us, which is why I shall omit extensive 
discussion of the point here. The point of the IMM/DAB distinction is that seemingly different kinds of confirmation 
activities share in the same framework of representation. 
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My aim here is to use the DAB-IMM distinction to show that seemingly different 
practical processes of scale type confirmation share the same conceptual framework of 
measurement-relevant representation. I have explicated DAB and IMM in terms of volume and 
temperature to show that in both cases the underlying justification for the confirmation of the 
relevant scale type assumption has to do with the mirroring of empirical and numerical relational 
systems. In the case of volume, the establishment of the mirroring is direct, consisting of the mental 
association of certain mathematical operations with observed relations in terms of volume. In the 
case of temperature, the establishment of the mirroring is indirect, proceeding from the empirical-
to-empirical mirroring of differences in the volume of a thermometric substance to differences in 
temperature, and from there to the numerical-to-empirical mirroring pertaining to the interval scale 
assumption regarding temperature. The mirroring-based notion of representation grounds both 
cases, even though one is an example of DAB and the other an example of IMM. In this sense DAB 
and IMM share the same characterization of measurement-relevant representation, even though 
on the surface they may seem like very different kinds of activities. The upshot is that 
Representation Minimalism is compatible with common, model-based and non-model-based 
approaches to confirming scale type assumptions.  
 
6. Representation in measurement 
In this paper I have defined a notion of measurement-relevant representation. The definition I 
provided is: 
 
Representation Minimalism (ReM). In measurement, a numerical representation is appropriate 
when specified relations in the representing numerical system mirror empirical relations between 
entities, when entities are considered in terms of the target attribute.  
 
The rest of this paper defended this definition. First, I showed how ReM relates to 
RTM, arguing that RTM provides the formal foundations of ReM. Second, I showed that ReM is 
compatible with several common notions of the kinds of empirical relations measurement aims to 
represent. Third, and finally, I argued that ReM is compatible with plausible accounts of how scale 
types get confirmed.  
As in almost any philosophical field, there is considerable controversy in the 
measurement literature. Often it is not clear what exactly is the source of disagreement. This is 
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evidenced, for instance, by the confusion surrounding RTM: Is it a how-to account or merely the 
formal foundations of measurement? Are its axioms necessary for measurement or simply one 
approach among many? Is RTM an operationalist or a realist take on measurement? The motivation 
for formulating a minimal, bare bones account of representation is to try to find some common 
ground for these debates. If we can agree on some aspects of measurement-relevant 
representation, it is easier to keep track of the exact points of disagreement and to avoid talking 
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